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NO. 22 MARCH 2021 Introduction 
Turkish-Russian Adversarial 
Collaboration in Syria, Libya, and 
Nagorno-Karabakh 
Güney Yıldız 
Russia and Turkey are backing opposing warring parties in three active conflicts. How-
ever, this adversarial positioning has not hindered cooperation between Moscow 
and Ankara. They reign in opposing sides and, in effect, stage-manage their respective 
theatres of wars. Through multilateral arrangements, Europe is an enabler of Tur-
key’s position and could leverage its support to push Ankara to cooperate more effec-
tively with its Western partners. 
 
Since 2015 in Syria and later in Libya and 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Moscow and Ankara 
have actively supported opposing warring 
parties. In each case, as explained below, 
Russia’s and Turkey’s military actions have 
strengthened one another and led to domi-
nation on their respective sides. We see an 
emergent pattern that is being established 
in Syria and turned into a calculated co-
operation model that is being implemented 
in Libya and the South Caucasus. 
How the Pattern Emerged in Syria 
Until 2016, among the two backers of Syria’s 
Bashar al-Assad regime, Iran had the upper 
hand over Russia and exerted more influ-
ence on the regime apparatus and the rul-
ing Assad family. Iran was the first country 
to come to Damascus’ help by providing 
weapons, financial support, advisors, and 
proxies to fight the armed rebellion. When 
Turkey doubled down on its involvement in 
Syria starting in late 2015, the Assad regime 
could not turn to Tehran for protection, 
since Iran lacked the capacity to deliver. 
As the Turkish threat was combined with 
the possibility of imminent and crippling 
Western airstrikes, the Assad regime had 
little choice but to become more reliant 
upon Russia. In that way, Turkey’s presence 
allowed Moscow to dominate the Syrian 
regime and reduce Iran’s influence. 
Turkey became the dominant backer of 
the opposition, as the armed groups realised 
they could not survive without Turkey due 
to Russia’s intervention. Regional rivals 
such as Saudi Arabia gradually lost influ-
ence on the ground. Western diplomatic 
and political influence over the Syrian op-
position also eroded – to Ankara’s benefit. 
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In December 2016, Vladimir Putin and 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan envisaged Astana, 
Kazakhstan’s capital, as a new venue for 
carrying on the Syria peace talks. In doing 
so, they also set in motion a game plan 
through which Moscow and Ankara con-
trolled the warring parties in Syria and took 
control of the conflict. The Astana Process 
removed international mediation mecha-
nisms set up in Vienna and Geneva from 
the centre of attention. The Turkish-Russian 
cooperation also further curbed Iran’s in-
fluence, since tensions between the Turkey-
backed rebels and proxies and the Assad 
regime had been resolved through bilateral 
Ankara-Moscow talks rather than in Astana. 
Ankara’s successful pressure campaign 
on Washington in 2019 to reduce the 
amount of help it was giving to the Syrian 
Kurds was of benefit to Moscow, which saw 
the presence of the United States and the 
partnership in eastern Syria to be much 
more challenging than Turkey’s presence in 
north-west Syria. In 2016, Russia had given 
the green light for the Turkish incursion 
into Syria. In return, Ankara, in effect, facili-
tated the regime takeover of Aleppo, the 
most important city under rebel control. 
Exporting the Model to Libya and 
South Caucasus 
In Libya, towards the end of 2019, Turkey 
began to increase its level of engagement 
with the UN-backed Tripoli government by 
sending military trainers, planners, Syrian 
mercenaries, and armed drones. On the 
opposite side, forces allied with Field Mar-
shal Khalifa Haftar received varying degrees 
of support from the United Arab Emirates, 
Egypt, France, and Russia. Haftar was able 
to leverage these backers against one an-
other. But the intensity of the Turkish 
intervention increased Haftar’s reliance on 
Russia for military backing, because it soon 
became apparent that only Moscow could 
provide the eastern Libyan forces with the 
necessary advanced weaponry and the per-
sonnel to operate them to stop the Turkish-
backed government forces in Tripoli. Russia 
swiftly provided Pantsir-type air defence sys-
tems, operatives of Wagner – a pro-Krem-
lin private security firm – Syrian merce-
naries, and eventually, in the autumn of 
2020, game-changer MiG-29 and Su-24 
fighter jets to Haftar’s Libyan National 
Army forces. The deployment of these Rus-
sian fighter jets stopped the counter-offen-
sive by the Tripoli-based government. The 
conflict has since frozen, and there have 
been no significant territorial changes. 
Once again, Turkey and Russia helped one 
another become the top influential external 
powers in a foreign country. The involve-
ment of the United States has varied – 
from aid programmes to diplomatic pres-
sure on warring parties to return to the UN-
led peace process. Washington’s aim to 
reduce the amount of foreign interference 
has so far not succeeded. 
In the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, the 
United States and France, along with Rus-
sia, failed to utilise the Minsk Group plat-
form of the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe to broker a nego-
tiated solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. The United States and France had 
lost most of their influence over the dispute 
by the end of the 45-day war between Azer-
baijan and Armenian forces in early Novem-
ber 2020. Nikol Pashinyan, the Armenian 
prime minister, has been pushing for a pro-
Western agenda since 2018 to balance rela-
tions with Russia. On the other hand, the 
Azerbaijani government enjoys good rela-
tions with multiple actors – including Rus-
sia, Turkey, and Israel – but not with Iran. 
When Turkey stepped up its support for the 
Azeri offensive against the Armenians, it 
left the Yerevan government without much 
choice but to turn to Russia for help. Tur-
key also benefited by increasing and for-
malising its influence over Azerbaijan and 
in the region. Russia consolidated its posi-
tion as the dominant external power over 
Armenia, with the Nagorno-Karabakh war 
leaving Pashinyan domestically weakened. 
This pattern was successfully implemented 
in three theatres of war, and not necessarily 
through official agreements laying out the 
rules of the game plan. It works because the 
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actors came to understand that this ap-
proach is beneficial for both. The lack of a 
determined third actor from the West in 
any of the theatres of war also facilitated 
the Turkish-Russian experiment in their 
adversarial collaboration. 
Why Russia Prefers Turkey As the 
Rival of Choice 
Russia prefers Turkey to other rivals because 
Moscow has more – and at times decisive – 
leverage on Ankara. The asymmetric balance 
of power between the two was established 
in the aftermath of Turkey shooting down 
a Russian fighter jet in November 2015 in 
the context of the Syrian conflict. Within 
months, Moscow utilised various factors to 
pressure Turkey. Visible measures ranged 
from restricting trade and travel between 
the two countries and a threat to stop in-
vestment into its nuclear energy infrastruc-
ture to official media campaigns targeting 
the Turkish president and his family. Less 
visible and indirect steps included Russia 
lending active political support to Kurds in 
Syria and Turkey and potential military sup-
port to fighters in the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK) battling the Turkish military. 
The episode demonstrated that the Kremlin 
has more options to hit Turkey economically 
and politically than vice-versa. 
Russia is, thus, the senior partner in this 
relationship. In Syria, Libya, and South Cau-
casus, there are various significant gains that 
Turkey can achieve by cooperating with 
Russia. Russian help in Syria could prevent 
a de jure Kurdish autonomy in the country. 
In Libya, sidelining other backers of Haftar 
and the Tripoli government could help 
secure Turkish economic and political inter-
ests, including getting Libya to back Turkey’s 
claims for exclusive economic zones in 
the Eastern Mediterranean. Through Turkish-
Azeri cooperation in Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Ankara aims to increase its military foot-
print and enlist the Azeri leadership to part-
ner against third parties across the region. 
As relations between Russia and Turkey be-
come even more complicated – with coor-
dinated efforts and rivalries in three coun-
tries and other bilateral relationships be-
tween Turkey and Russia – the risks con-
cerning each theatre of war decrease fur-
ther. The duo could still contain problems 
in an individual theatre of war through 
quid pro quos in various areas of their rela-
tionship. 
“Reflexive Control” 
Borrowed from science, the term “adver-
sarial collaboration” denotes experiments 
conducted by people who disagree on an 
issue to resolve or reduce their differences. 
In the present context, it is employed to 
describe Russia and Turkey opting to experi-
ment with a collaborative relationship at 
the expense of other actors. This is achieved 
after establishing an asymmetric balance 
of power that ensures Turkey will lose more 
and Russia will win less if they continue 
with a zero-sum game strategy. The strategy 
emerged as a result of the improvisation 
and political calculations of the Kremlin 
and the Presidential Palace in Ankara. 
However, the theoretical core of the 
adversarial collaboration has its roots in 
the concept known as “reflexive control”, 
a Soviet-era technique used to manipulate 
an opponent into making decisions that 
lead to their defeat. This technique has 
been updated and implemented by Vladis-
lav Surkov, who was Putin’s adviser until 
February 2020. Surkov, who is dubbed the 
“puppet master” of the Kremlin, managed 
several projects inside Russia to control the 
domestic political landscape. These involved 
simultaneously supporting civic forums 
and human rights NGO’s as well as the 
nationalist movements that accuse those 
same forums of being Western agents. The 
method transcends the tactic of supporting 
one conflicting side against the other and 
involves engaging with both parties to the 
advantage of one against the other. 
In conflicts beyond Russian territory, 
reflexive control is not straightforward. 
Moscow would not have the same level of 
control over the entire geopolitical land-
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scape as it would within Russia. With Tur-
key’s help, though, Russia can replicate 
abroad a pattern that is well-versed at home. 
Russia controls one side; Turkey dominates 
the opposing party. Through its multiple 
layers of leverage against Turkey, Moscow 
came to influence both warring parties in 
Syria, Libya, and South Caucasus – directly 
through its own engagement, and indirectly 
through Ankara’s engagement. 
The Turkish establishment is also not 
alien to methods for managing the domes-
tic opposition. These include setting up 
fake opposition parties and groups to side-
line real threats, as was exemplified in the 
early days of the Turkish republic when 
President Mustafa Kemal Ataturk set up a 
government-sanctioned communist party 
while eliminating the leaders of the authen-
tic Communist Party of Turkey. 
Where Is the EU in All This? 
The EU is one of the enablers of Turkey’s 
policy towards Russia. Positioning itself 
within Western multilateral arrangements 
gives Ankara an edge over Moscow. 
Syria is a good example. Western support 
helps Ankara pressure Moscow to limit the 
Russian-backed advances of the Syrian regime 
in Idlib. The Transatlantic Alliance’s sup-
port is currently not conditional on Turkey 
coordinating with the West on broader 
Syrian policy. In other words, Ankara plays 
Western support as a card when negotiat-
ing with Russia, but it does not coordinate 
its actions with its partners. Leading Euro-
pean countries such as Germany and France 
have so far limited themselves to providing 
passive diplomatic, political, and economic 
support for Turkish actions in Syria. Realis-
ing that it is an enabler of the Turkish bal-
ancing act against Russia, the EU could make 
its support conditional in order to push 
Turkey towards more effective cooperation. 
Understanding Turkish-Russian relations 
within the framework of power imbalances 
and the analysed mechanism, the EU could 
make a more realistic assessment of the 
nature of the adversarial collaboration be-
tween Moscow and Ankara. The adversarial 
positioning in each of these theatres of war 
will not lead to active confrontation between 
Ankara and Moscow. This assessment, which 
runs contrary to some analysts’ expecta-
tions, will remain the case as long as Russia 
holds the cards, such as potential interven-
tion into the Kurdish conflict by threaten-
ing to provide rebels with access to sophis-
ticated Russian weaponry. 
Although a military confrontation be-
tween Russia and Turkey is unlikely, the 
equilibrium between Turkey and Russia 
may still change and lead to one of the two 
gradually losing out. The killing of dozens 
of Turkish soldiers in Idlib as a result of Rus-
sian-backed aerial bombardment was one 
episode showing how Turkey could lose out 
if and when coordination with Moscow fails. 
The Russian-Turkish partnership para-
digm, which is, in essence, a military con-
trol model, has proven to be useful in 
controlling conflicts and turning them into 
frozen ones. Keeping conflicts frozen could 
be more costly and risky than bringing 
about reconciliation to those conflicts in a 
way that would allow Moscow and Ankara 
to maintain influence. This potential weak-
ness is on display in the arduously slow 
pace of political resolution efforts in Syria 
under the Astana Process. But in Libya, 
Moscow and Turkey may see the first big 
failure of their model: The UN-led process 
for reconciliation between the Tripoli and 
Benghazi governments received support 
from a significant portion of military lead-
ers on the ground as well as backing from 
the United States, France, and increasingly 
Italy. The Libya example demonstrates 
that the Russian-Turkish model is weaker 
against attempts made by third parties to 
achieve peaceful reconciliations. 
Therefore, if Ankara wants to have a 
long-term, lasting influence in the conflict-
ridden regions, aligning itself with Euro-
pean partners is a better option to win the 
peace – and not just to control the conflict. 
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